Li Andersson (Left Alliance, Finland): 'Putin and Trump want a world where countries choose when to comply with international law and when not to'

Published on 27 February 2025

By Li Andersson & Albert Scharenberg

Published on 27 February 2025

First published on Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has impacted not only Eastern European states but also Scandinavian countries in a particular way. This primarily concerns Finland, which previously belonged to the Russian Empire and which, after gaining independence in late 1917, was attacked by the Soviet Union in 1939 as part of the so-called Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Today, the country shares a border of more than 1,300 kilometres with Russia. After decades of largely independent foreign and defence policies, Finland joined NATO in spring 2023.

At that time, Li Andersson was still Minister of Education in the cabinet led by Social Democrat Sanna Marin and leader of Vasemmistoliitto, the Left Alliance. After a right-wing government replaced the five-party coalition, she was elected to the European Parliament in summer 2024. During a recent visit to our headquarters in Berlin, Albert Scharenberg of the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation spoke with her about the implications of Russia's war of aggression in Ukraine for Finland and Europe in terms of security and defence policy.

Since Russia launched its war of aggression against Ukraine, critics inside and outside the left have claimed that socialist parties should take security and defence policy more seriously. Do you agree with this assessment? What kind of reflection has your own party, the Left Alliance, undertaken?

When the Russian invasion of Ukraine began, the Left Alliance was part of the Finnish government. We all want peace, but this invasion forced us to have difficult discussions and debates, because as a party in power, it is not enough to formulate general statements about the importance of peace. You really have to be able to take a position on difficult issues concerning defence and security.

However, we were somewhat prepared regarding our policy concepts. For example, the Left Alliance was already in favour of general conscription in the Finnish armed forces, so we did not need to reformulate our policies in this regard. But we had to accept an increase in defence spending.

This position of the Finnish left was not isolated, however. The same decisions were made by other Nordic parties, as we were all faced with the same situation: a neighbouring country waging a conventional war against another country in violation of international law. From our point of view, it is crucial that the left very clearly condemns Russia's war of aggression and supports Ukraine, including with weapons. The challenge for the left is that Putin has forced us to think differently about defence issues. It's not something we would have wanted, but we can no longer exclude the threat of war.

In response to the war and widespread fears of Russian aggression, both Finland and Sweden joined NATO. How has the Left Alliance accommodated this new reality?

Indeed, the most difficult question that arose in Finland after the Russian invasion was that of NATO membership. For us, the real question wasn't that we were eager to join NATO, but that we needed security guarantees – I think that's an important difference to emphasise from a left perspective. And it's exactly the same concern that other Eastern European countries have at the moment.

My party accepts Finland's membership of NATO as a fact. That said, we focus on what we want Finland to do within NATO, for example by campaigning against nuclear weapons and ensuring that NATO prioritises defence, instead of engaging in operations outside NATO territory.

Nevertheless, NATO membership has not upended Finland's traditional foreign and security policy. Before joining NATO, Finland was militarily non-aligned, but as EU members, we did not call ourselves neutral. Unfortunately, Putin has made this option less credible in terms of defence and security policies, since we have now seen Russia invade a sovereign country that was outside this type of security architecture.

I think one of the biggest mistakes we made as a left-wing party was not taking the initiative to create and develop an alternative European security architecture, including security guarantees. This could have been a concrete and real alternative to NATO membership, which we could have put forward in the debates that arose in Sweden and Finland after the invasion of Ukraine.

I understand that this is a very difficult debate. I fully respect that there are other positions within the European left, and I am perfectly aware of all the problems related to NATO. But I think the biggest problem was that in terms of security guarantees, there weren't really any other options on the table. And I think the left should be self-critical and say that we didn't develop this kind of solution earlier, which would have been useful to reduce NATO's role.

Only two years after Finland and Sweden joined, NATO is led by none other than Donald Trump. What are the implications for Europe?

The first thing Trump will push for is a further increase in military spending. I don't think we will support this, or even put in place any spending target. Our position is that we don't want to lock defence spending to a certain percentage of GDP, like two percent of GDP or even more. Moreover, I really think that setting such a target is a senseless way to measure defence capabilities. Defence spending should not be based on abstract targets, but on needs and priorities.

It has happened, for example, that Finland has had to, say, renew its air force and buy new aircraft. In such a situation, defence spending increases. But once the investment has been made, it can and should decrease, even below NATO's two percent target.

More generally, Finland was already spending a lot on defence before joining NATO. This was a consequence of not being part of NATO. It's very simple: Without a military alliance, you have to be prepared to spend enough to put in place a credible defence on your own.

Given Trump's approach to international diplomacy, does Europe need a more independent security policy? And if so, what needs to be done to achieve it?

Above all, we believe that at the moment, a central goal of our security policy and foreign policy should be to reduce dependencies on the United States. This goes back to the options we lacked when Russia invaded Ukraine. So, we need an increased role for European cooperation in the field of security and defence policies. This includes strengthening Europe within NATO.

That's why we also need a discussion within the EU regarding our arms industries. If you look at European defence spending, you'll see that a large portion of the money is spent on buying American weapons. But do we really want to fund the American military-industrial complex? We think it's better to use our money to strengthen European cooperation.

The big lesson for Europe regarding Trump is that we need to be ready to stand on our own feet. We can't fall back on the United States, and we shouldn't want to. But if we say we want to reduce European dependence on the United States, some countries will probably need to spend a bit more on defence compared to what they were spending before.

Would you say that the European goal should be to acquire some sort of "strategic autonomy" from the United States?

Yes, it's a useful concept for the left because it relates to this time and moment. How can we reduce Europe's dependence on the United States? I think that should be a unifying question for the left.

It also contains an industrial policy dimension that goes beyond the defence industry. Many policies discussed at the moment are more or less in line with how the left generally thinks about public investment in our industries. The need not to depend on American or Chinese technological monopolies, and to develop these industries in Europe – the need for an energy transition of our industries, for example.

At the same time, we know that a less interdependent world also presents new risks. I think the left should be able to communicate that. I don't think we should cut all ties in terms of exchanges or trade, or pursue a Trumpist policy of high tariffs and protectionism – that's not really a progressive alternative either. Thinking in terms of strategic autonomy could be good for Europe from a left perspective, but we shouldn't interpret that as some kind of isolationist policy like the ones we can see being implemented today, particularly by the xenophobic far right.

Regarding the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Europe has been very outspoken and also quite solidarity-oriented with the country under attack. Regarding Gaza, the story is quite different. While the Gaza war has been widely condemned in the Global South, the European Union and its member states have remained rather quiet about it. In your view, do European countries need to stand up more firmly against the war waged by Israel?

I absolutely think so. The actions of the so-called Western countries, including the vast majority of EU member states, will have a devastating effect on multilateral institutions and the role of international law. Their double standards are so blatant. The comparison between Ukraine and Gaza makes things even clearer. There are EU countries signalling that they will not enforce the International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrants when it comes to Israeli leaders, but who, at the same time, have demanded that the Global South support us when it comes to arresting Putin. Even though it's the same court that issued both arrest warrants! This kind of hypocrisy is simply staggering.

We are approaching a breaking point in terms of global politics, and the erosion, or rather the destruction of rules-based international institutions is one of the most dangerous developments. This is what leaders like Putin and Trump want: to find themselves in a world where countries choose when they want to comply with international law and when they don't. That's exactly the type of world order they are trying to shape. Of course, this is bad news for forces working for peace, international cooperation and understanding, and a rules-based order. It shows how strangely this world has evolved and how strong the far right has become.

I think the incredibly weak response of EU countries to the Gaza genocide will widen the gap between the South and the North. This is a very important issue for the left – we must strive to bridge this gap. We need to show actors in the North and South that there are still forces, movements and parties that agree and are ready to work together to defend the institutions of international law and human rights.

Lately, there has been a lot of talk about a ceasefire in Ukraine. What do you think the left's demands should be in this context?

I think the left needs to understand that if there is a ceasefire – and after that, hopefully, some kind of more durable negotiation regarding the future of Ukraine – part of that negotiation will have to be about the question of the security architecture that Ukraine will be part of. It must be clear that Ukraine cannot be left behind.

In my opinion, EU membership would be the most intelligent solution for Ukraine and should be the priority. It's easier than NATO membership – which the new US administration has ruled out anyway. Ukrainian membership of the EU would also allow them to be part of the European security architecture. As things stand, there are certain political guarantees, even if, from a defence perspective, they are not as strong as NATO membership.

I think the European left should position itself in favour of Ukraine's EU membership after this war. We should still demand that they meet the formal conditions. It won't be easy – they will need a lot of support to reform their own administration and society to meet the criteria. But it will also represent a huge change for the EU in terms of decision-making on resource allocation within the Union. It's a big question for the future of the EU, as well as for European citizens in general. We need people to understand why it's important and to feel involved.

Additionally, if there is a ceasefire, there will need to be a peacekeeping mission in Ukraine. Foreign soldiers will have to be present on Ukrainian territory to enforce the ceasefire. The new US Secretary of Defence, Pete Hegseth, has already stated that American soldiers will not be part of a peacekeeping mission in Ukraine and has shifted this responsibility to Europe. So the question arises whether a European presence is sufficient to maintain the ceasefire. Personally, I think Europe should be sufficient.

Should the left also focus on what is happening in Ukraine? And shouldn't we criticise the West's plundering of Ukrainian resources, such as the rare earth agreement that Trump recently demanded?

Definitely. The left should denounce these horrible "agreements", or rather extortions, and focus on Ukrainian society.

Since the beginning of the war, we have been calling for the cancellation of Ukraine's state debt. This is a crucial issue because otherwise, Ukrainians will end up completely dependent on foreign lenders. That's neither autonomy nor independence. So I think we should continue to campaign on this issue and work with Ukrainian civil society, trade unions, and progressive movements on issues such as control of natural resources, workers' rights, etc.

Right now, there's a big debate in Ukraine about the country's labour laws. From what I understand, the government is trying to make permanent some of the changes made to labour law under martial law. This would significantly weaken workers' rights as well as the role of trade unions. This is exactly the kind of issue we need to politicise. We should cooperate with the Ukrainian left and support them in the work they are doing in their society for the same kind of ideals and general political goals that we all share.

Another example is the huge housing crisis in Ukraine. Why is no one discussing these issues within the EU? Too many observers are only interested in military issues, and not in domestic issues that are of paramount importance to Ukrainians themselves – and these issues are related to the question of social justice in Ukraine. That's what we should focus on.

To conclude, as a member of the European Parliament, what do you think should be Europe's main goal in the current political climate?

I think many citizens want Europe to take the lead in this geopolitical situation. They expect us to build an alternative to this authoritarian, fascist and violent regime that is spreading across the world. We need voices that have a different analysis of the role we want to play – strong voices for international law, human rights, for a real solution to the climate crisis, which has a much broader impact on our security and safety than military defence.

However, this requires a willingness to fight against these technological monopolies and the richest people in the world who are very openly seeking to transform their economic power into political power. Will Europe do this? The biggest fight we are going to wage in the European Parliament in the coming years is against the far right. Which side will prevail and define the EU's position in this new geopolitical landscape? That will be the decisive battle.